This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the notions we introduce. We also discuss a framework for ex ante, interim and ex post preferences.
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(Co-authors: M. Pesce and N. Yannelis)
Abstract:
This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the notions we introduce. We also discuss a framework for ex ante, interim and ex post preferences.
Keywords
Maximin core, Maximin Walrasian equilibrium, Incentive compatibility, Ambiguity, ex ante, interim and ex post preferences
JEL Classification
D51, D6, D8
Citation:
de Castro, L., Pesce, M. and Yannelis, N. C. (2011): “Core and Equilibria under ambiguity”, Economic Theory, 48, 519-548